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Introduction
In late 1990, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA),' the culmination of a
lengthy effort by visual artists and a small band of their advocates to
bring "moral rights" for visual artists into effect throughout the United
States. The law became effective on June 1, 1991.2 The first five years
of its application have brought little clarification and not a little
confusion to the interpretation of these new rights.
Moral rights, which give an artist some control over works she has
created even after she has parted with ownership of them, were long
seen as inconsistent with the common law tradition. Anglo-American
law starts from a premise that an owner exercises full control over his
property,3 and we tend to think of works of visual art as just another
kind of property, albeit often more attractive or provocative than
other forms. Yet ownership of property is rarely absolute. We are
accustomed to restrictions on the use of property (particularly real
property), imposed for zoning, environmental regulation, health, or
other reasons. How far those restrictions may go before becoming an
unconstitutional "taking" is a matter currently very much on the minds
of our courts and legislatures.4
Such restrictions, however, rarely apply to personal property. But
in the case of certain fine art, there are now limitations on the
dominion of an owner over his personal property. These non-
economic (or "spiritual" or "personal") rights of artists are called
"moral rights" after their name in France ("droit moral"), where they
originated around the turn of the century.5 Such rights of the artist
have come lately to this country, first adopted by a few states less than
two decades ago, and now recognized by federal law in an effort to
impose nation-wide, uniform application. The new federal law, which
1. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, 104 Stat. 5128
(codified in part in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113,301,411,412, 506 (1996)).
2. VARA § 610(a), 104 Stat. 5128.
3. For example, California law provides that "[t]he ownership of a thing is the right of one
or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code the thing of which
there may be ownership is called property." Cal. Civ. Code § 654 (West 1982). See Edward J.
Damich, Moral Rights Protection and Resale Royalties for Visual Art in the United States:
Development and Current Status, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387, 388 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, Environmental Law Is
Wrecking the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995 at A23 (discussing Congressional
proposals).
5. RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 417-18 (1989).
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to some extent preempts similar laws of a number of states, limits an
owner's right to modify or destroy certain works of art without the
artist's permission, even though he is the sole and absolute owner. The
artist may also prevent the owner from concealing or misrepresenting
the artist's authorship of a work. Whether and to what degree these
restrictions on the rights of property ownership would harmonize with
the traditions of American law was a concern expressed by some at the
time the federal law was enacted.6
This essay surveys the background to and provisions of the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 and then discusses the significant
developments concerning moral rights since the enactment of VARA,
including some difficult issues that have already emerged under the
federal statute.
I
The Background of VARA
As they developed in France and were adopted in countries in
continental Europe, moral rights of an artist included the right of
"integrity" (to protect her work from distortion, modification, or
destruction) and the right of "attribution" (to have her name
associated with her work and not to have her name associated with
works not created by her or with distorted versions of her work), as
well as other rights.7
The basic moral rights were incorporated into the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the
International Copyright Union, which was adopted initially by a group
of primarily European countries in 1886. The agreement provides that
"[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."' But the
United States did not initially join the Berne Convention. It eschewed
6. See, e.g., George C. Smith, Let the Buyer of Art Beware, RECORDER, Jan. 10, 1991, at 6.
7. See generally John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffett, 27 HASTINGS
L. J. 1023, 1023-28 (1976). The other moral rights traditionally include "divulgation" (the right to
determine when to disclose a work to the public) and "retraction" (the right to withdraw a work
from publication if the artist provides indemnity to the owner). See LERNER & BRESLER, supra
note 5, at 418-21.
8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art.
6bis, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27 (1986), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706,3714-15.
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the agreement for more than 100 years, in part because of this very
provision. Much of the reluctance came from publishers and film
studios, which were concerned about lawsuits if they modified works
they controlled.' For much of this century, therefore, artists' moral
rights went unrecognized in this country, a fact underscored by the few
recorded court decisions where artists attempted to assert such rights.
One illustrative case involved a well-known mural painter named
Alfred Crimi. In 1937, he won a competition to design and execute a
large fresco in a New York City church. The commission contract
provided, and the nature of a fresco required, that the mural would
become part of the church building. After the mural was completed in
late 1938, some parishioners objected because Christ was portrayed
with a bare chest. They also felt there was too much emphasis on
Christ's physical rather than spiritual qualities. In 1946, when the
church was redecorated, the mural was painted over. No one advised
Crimi. °
Crimi discovered the act through a friend and sued the church to
require removal of the obliterating paint or for damages. Crimi
claimed that an artist had, as he put it, "a continued limited
proprietary interest in his work after its sale, to the extent reasonably
necessary to the protection of his honor and reputation as an artist,
and that within this limited ambit of protection was the right to have
the work continue without destruction, mutilation, obliteration, or
alteration."" The court posed the question as "whether the sale by an
artist of a work wipes out any interest he might have therein"' 2 and
then observed that the idea that artists "have peculiar and distinctive
rights in their work has been accepted in some countries of the
Continent of Europe."' 3 The Crimi court ultimately concluded that no
9. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years
Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1 (1988); JAY DRATLER,
JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 6.01[6] (1991).
10. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813,813-15 (1949).
11. Id.'at 816.
12. Id. at 815.
13. Id. at 816. The court then quoted a 1940 Harvard Law Review article to make an
important distinction:
The right to prevent deformation does not include the right to prevent destruction of a
created work. The doctrine of moral right finds one social basis in the need of the
creator for protection of his honor and reputation. To deform his work is to present
him to the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus make him subject to
criticism for work he has not done; the destruction of his work does not have this result.
Id. (quoting Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 569 (1940)).
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applicable moral right had been recognized in this country by
legislation or court decision.'4
In 1979, visual artists finally convinced one state legislature
(perhaps predictably, California's) to enact a statute specifically
protecting their moral rights.15 It was the result of a two-year effort by
a group of California artists and interested lawyers, who were
galvanized by such events as the fate of a Calder sculpture in
Pittsburgh. That work had been donated to the Airport Commission
to hang in the airport. It was a mobile, black and white, designed to be
suspended from the ceiling and to move freely. Before hanging the
piece, however, and without the consent or knowledge of Calder, the
Airport Commission ordered the work painted green and gold,
Pittsburgh's colors, and immobilized it. Nothing prevented these
changes; the Commission owned the work. Artists and others
throughout the country were appalled. 16
The California Art Preservation Act was the first U.S. statute to
protect the rights of attribution and integrity of creators of fine art.
Since 1979, eleven states in all have adopted some sort of statutory
protection for artists' rights.17 These state statutes are all limited to
14. The Crimi court relied on an earlier decision involving the moral right of "attribution."
In Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947), the artist Vargas had terminated his
contract to supply Esquire with drawings at a time when the magazine had on hand a number of
his drawings. Contrary to previous practice, Esquire subsequently published these drawings
without Vargas' name on them. Vargas sought an injunction and damages, asserting a "moral
right" to have the drawings attributed to him. The court affirmed dismissal of Vargas' complaint,
noting that the artist had cited no authority but the law of several foreign countries with civil law
systems:
What [Vargas] in reality seeks is a change in the law of this country to conform to that
of certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire whether such a change, if
desirable, is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of government; in any event
we are not disposed to make any new law in this respect.
164 F.2d at 526.
In contrast to Vargas and Crimi, a few decisions have stretched traditional legal concepts in
the direction of moral rights. In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on copyright law and unfair competition principles to find a cause
of action based on the broadcasting of a truncated version of a Monty Python television program.
538 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1976). In Follett v. New American Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), the district court held that misattribution of authorship gave rise to a cause of
action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982).
16. See Richard Mayer, California Arts Legislation Goes Federal, 15 HASTINGS CoMM/ENr
L.J. 981, 981 (1993); Thomas M. Goetzl, Peril of Art, RECORDER, Oct. 8, 1991, at 8.
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s (West 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. R.S. 51:2152 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.970 (Michie
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some form of visual art, and they vary considerably in their scope-
how they define art and the particular protection they provide.
California defines "fine art" as: "an original painting, sculpture, or
drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality, but
shall not include work prepared under contract for commercial use by
its purchaser." 18 The requirement of "recognized quality" is to be
determined by the trier of fact who "shall rely on the opinions of
artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, and
other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art." 19
Four other states also require that the work be of "recognized
quality." 2 These states recognize "a public interest in preserving the
integrity of cultural and artistic creations," as well as the individual
artist's right to personality and reputation. t In general, the state
statutes vary as to the artistic media they make subject to protection.
Some states cover such items as photographs, crafts, holograms, films,
and videotapes.' Some include multiple editions, and many
encompass reproductions.23
The states that include protection for reproductions, as well as for
originals, emphasize the reputation of the artist, rather than the
integrity of the work, as the object of their protection. New York, for
example, specifies that:
no person except the artist or a person acting with the artist's
consent shall knowingly display in a place accessible to the public or
publish a work of fine art or limited edition multiple . . . or a
reproduction thereof in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified
form if the work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the
work of the artist, or under circumstances under which it would
1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2 (West 1996); N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.01 (Consol. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 (West 1993), § 2101; R.I.
GEN LAWS § 5-62-2 (West 1987). A comprehensive analysis and comparison of ten states' statutes
is set out in Edward J. Damich, State "Moral Rights" Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 291 (1989), written just before Nevada's law was adopted.
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West 1996).
19. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(f).
20. See Damich, supra note 17, at 343. The four states are Louisiana, Massachusetts, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania.
21. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85s(a) (West 1985).
22. E.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b) ("Fine arts"). For an analysis of the works
protected by the different statutes, see Damich, supra note 17, at 296-99.
23. See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1) (Consol. 1996); see generally Damich,
supra note 17, at 303.
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reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artist, and damage
to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom.'
Consistent with concern for the artist's reputation, most states,
including New York, do not actually prohibit total destruction of a
work. Only four states, including California, do so.'
As this brief survey suggests, there are two different premises
underlying these moral rights statutes. States that prohibit destruction
assume a right in the artist (or the interested public) to have the work
of art preserved. They are concerned about the integrity of the artist's
original work, rather than with the fate of reproductions. Those states
that restrict only modification are focused on protecting the artist's
reputation; hence, these states' statutes typically proscribe the public
display of an altered original work (and usually of a reproduction) but
not its destruction. When they address the issue, the state laws usually
provide that any alterations due to conservation work do not
constitute violations of the artist's rights unless they are the result of
negligence or gross negligence.' 6
With respect to the right of attribution, most statutes are similar
to California's, which provides that the artist shall "retain at all times
the right to claim authorship, or, for a just and valid reason, to disclaim
authorship of his or her work. ' In general, the artist is the only one
who may enforce the rights during her lifetime, and most state statutes
are silent about whether the rights survive the artist's death. In
contrast, five states specifically provide that the rights exist-and may
be enforced by, for example, heirs, beneficiaries, or the Attorney
General-until the fiftieth anniversary of the death of the artist.' Half
the states require that any waiver of moral rights be in a writing signed
by the artist. The other state statutes are silent on the issue of waiver,
24. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1).
25. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s to 42-
116t (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(c) (West 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§§ 2101-10 (West 1996).
26. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(c)(2) (West 1996).
27. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(d) (West 1996).
28. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE. § 987(g)(1); see Damich, supra note 17, at 323-24, 347. The fifty
year post-death period is presumably drawn from the Berne Convention, which specifies this
minimum period for signatory nations, but also includes a provision that countries whose
legislation when they join the Convention does not provide protection beyond the life of the
author need not do so. Berne Convention, supra note 8, Art. 6bis(2). See also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(1994).
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so (operating on the presumption of alienability) artists' rights may be
waived in those jurisdictions.'
A difficult problem addressed by some states is what provision to
make for art works that are incorporated into a building and thus
cannot be removed without substantial alteration or destruction, as in
Crimi. The California solution, similar to that of most of the other five
states that have dealt with the problem, is to deem the artist's rights
waived unless the building owner has signed and recorded a writing
preserving the artist's rights. ° If such a writing is recorded, it is binding
on future owners of the building. If the work is incorporated into a
building but can be removed without alteration or destruction, the
artist's rights continue unless the building owner who intends to
remove or damage the work makes a diligent effort to notify the artist
of the intended action, and either fails to notify the artist, or does
notify the artist and the artist fails within 90 days to remove the work
or pay for its removal. Then the owner may remove the work.3'
II
The Visual Artists Rights Act
The states that have enacted moral rights statutes mostly did so
during the decade between 1980 and 1990. Meanwhile, in 1988, the
U.S. finally signed onto the Berne Convention (after every
industrialized nation except China and the Soviet Union) through
Senate ratification and the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988.32 The Berne Convention, while requiring the recognition of
certain moral rights of "authors," 33 provides that the means of redress
shall be governed by the laws of the country where protection is
claimed.' Congress initially took the position that existing federal and
state laws were sufficient to comply with all the moral rights
requirements of Berne.Y5 This somewhat dubious stance was likely the
result of pressure from publishing and motion picture interests, which
pushed to have the United States join the Berne Convention to
29. See Damich, supra note 17, at 326-27, 347.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(h) (West 1996); see Damich, supra note 17, at 318-19.
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(h).
32. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
33. Berne Convention, supra note 8, Art. 6bis(1).
34. Berne Convention, supra note 8, Art. 6bis(2), (3).
35. See S. Rep. No. 352, at 9-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714-15; H.R.
Rep. No. 609, at 32-40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. XX; H.R. Rep. No. 514, at 7-8
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6917-18.
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receive international copyright protection for their intellectual
property, but sought to avoid the constraints that would come with the
recognition of moral rights .6
By 1990, Congress had a narrow change of heart and adopted
specific moral rights legislation for the first time, limiting protection to
visual artists.3 The new legislation was adapted from a moral rights
proposal that had been advocated for some years by Senator Kennedy
and a few other members of Congress 8 The result, in the form of
several amendments to the Copyright Act, was tacked onto a pending
Judicial Improvements Act late in the legislative process as a separate
title, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, effective June 1, 1991.
The statute reads like a pastiche of the various state moral rights
laws. VARA borrows from New York's approach to the right of
integrity in its provision that "the author of a work of visual
art . . shall have the right . . to prevent any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."3 In addition, VARA
borrows from California's approach in giving artists the right "to
prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature."'  As with
many state statutes, modification caused by conservation is not a
violation of the artist's rights unless due to gross negligence. 41 VARA
also provides rights of attribution, specifically, the right to claim
authorship, and the right of an artist to prevent the use of his or her
name as the author of a work not created, or one created but modified
36. One commentator called this position "fashion[ing] a loincloth or at least a G-string,
that will cover our moral rights nakedness." Ralph S. Brown, Adherence to the Berne Copyright
Convention: The Moral Rights Issue, 35 J. COPYRIGHT. Soc'Y 196, 204 (1988); see also Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 478-79
(1990); see generally William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO.
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 373 (1995).
37. Visual art "presents the strongest, and most distinct, claim for moral rights protection
because of the unique importance of the physical object." Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 479; see
also H.R. Rep. No. 514, at 8-9 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6918-19.
3& See Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990-What It Does and What It
Preempts, 23 PAC. L.J. 445, 469-73 (1992); Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990: American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373,407-08 (1995).
39. VARA § 603(a), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1994).
40. VARA § 603(a), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). VARA does not make clear whether
"recognized stature" is different from "recognized quality," the standard used in the state
statutes. Some commentators have asserted that VARA's term is more restrictive. See, e.g., Peter
H. Karlen, What's Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights, 15 HASTINGS
COMM/ENT L.J. 905,916 (1993).
41. VARA § 603(a), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2).
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in a way that would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation, 4
a standard similar to most state provisions.'
VARA specifies at great length the kinds of work to which these
rights apply. The law covers photographs "produced for exhibition
purposes only," as well as paintings, drawings, prints, and sculptures.
Multiples are limited to editions of two hundred or fewer.' Unlike the
New York statute, VARA does not apply to reproductions 4 As
discussed more below, VARA specifically excludes from its protection
applied art or work made for hire. Under VARA, "[o]nly the author
of a work of visual art has the rights conferred" by the statute,
"whether or not the author is the copyright owner;" and the rights
"endure for a term consisting of the life of the author."' As under
state laws, the rights may be waived, but VARA requires that the
waiver be in a writing which specifically identifies the work and the
uses to which the waiver applies.47
With respect to art permanently attached to buildings ("in such a
way that removing the work from the building will cause the
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the
work"), 48 such art is protected by VARA unless both the owner of the
building and the artist have signed a writing that recognizes that
installation of the work may subject it to destruction or modification
by reason of its removal.49 As one commentator presciently observed
in 1993, under the state statutes, "if the artist failed to obtain a written
reservation or the owner refused to give one, the artist might lose the
work upon its removal. Under VARA, however, the forgetful owner
could be saddled with a problem of immense proportions if the work
42. VARA § 603(a), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1), (2).
43. See Damich, supra note 17, at 306,345.
44. VARA § 602, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)("work of visual art"). The House Report on
VARA cautions that, "[t]he courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards
of the artistic community in determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of the
definition." H.R. Rep. No. 514, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6921.
45. Compare VARA § 602, 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("work of visual art"), with N.Y. ARTS. & CULT.
AFF. LAW § 14.03(1) (Consol. 1996).
46. VARA § 603,17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (d)(1).
47. VARA § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1). Congress was concerned that the waiver
provision might be routinely used to circumvent the statute. See H.R. Report 514, at 22 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6932; see also infra text accompanying notes 137-155
(discussing VARA's waiver provision).
48. VARA § 604, 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(A) (1994).
49. VARA § 604, 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B).
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must be removed or the building demolished."' As we shall see, it did
not take long for this prediction to be fulfilled.
VARA also contains a specific preemption provision, which
makes federal law the exclusive remedy with respect to all rights "that
are equivalent to any of the rights" conferred by the statute.51
However, the preemption provision expressly does not annul or limit
any rights under state law that are not equivalent or that extend
beyond the life of the author. 52 Presumably, a photograph prepared
for non-exhibition purposes in New York would still be protected by
that state's law, since VARA only covers photographs produced for
exhibition purposes. 53 And, California's protection of an artist's moral
rights for a fifty year period after the death of the artist would apply
after VARA's protections expire along with the artist.-'
in
Developments Under VARA
There have been relatively few published decisions concerning
VARA and moral rights since the enactment of the federal statute.
However, the decided cases-and a federal study mandated by VARA
and completed in March 1996-point up some of the interpretive
difficulties and lingering issues arising under VARA.
A. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.
The only appellate decision concerning VARA is an interesting
disappointment. While certainly reaching the correct result, the
Second Circuit in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,' left several
significant and troubling issues concerning VARA unresolved-at
least by any appellate court.
Carter pitted the property rights of the owner of an office building
against the right of integrity of the artists who had created a site-
specific sculptural artwork in the building's lobby. As noted above,
VARA provides that an artist retains his or her moral rights in a work
that is permanently affixed to a building, unless the artist has waived
50. Karlen, supra note 40, at 924.
51. VARA § 605, 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1) (1994).
52. VARA § 605, 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(B), (C).
53. VARA § 602, 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("work of visual art").
54. VARA § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
55. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995)[hereinafter Carter lI], reversing in part 861 F. Supp. 303
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)[hereinafter Carter 1], cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996).
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such rights in writing.-6 In 1990, a limited partnership had entered into
a long-term net lease of an office building in Queens, New York, a
huge converted warehouse, from its owner, an affiliate of Helmsley-
Spear. In December 1991, the managing agent for the lessee-
partnership made an agreement with three professional artists-each
with the first name "John" and known together as the "Three-Js" or
"Jx3"-"to design, create and install sculpture and other permanent
installations" primarily in the building's lobby.' The artists had "full
authority in design, color and style," although the manager retained
some authority to direct the location and installation of the artwork
within the building. The artists were to retain the copyrights to their
work, and receive fifty percent of any proceeds from its exploitation. 8
The managing agent paid each artist $1,000 per month, and provided
them with health and insurance benefits.59
From December 1991 until April 1994, the three artists "created
art work in the Lobby" of the building. Then, in April 1994, before
the work was finished, the net lease was terminated (presumably for
non-payment of rent), and a week later the limited partnership filed
for bankruptcy. Helmsley-Spear took control of the building, told the
artists to leave, and indicated that the artwork in the lobby would be
altered or removed.61 The artists, relying primarily on VARA, went to
federal court to protect their work.
Judge David Edelstein of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York issued a temporary restraining order
and then a preliminary injunction preventing Helmsley-Spear from
removing the artwork.' In August 1994, after a bench trial, Judge
Edelstein issued a permanent injunction in favor of the artists.' The
district court's opinion considered and decided several significant
issues of first impression under VARA.
56. VARA § 604, 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1).
57. Carter I, 71 F.3d at 80; Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 312.
58. Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80; Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 312.
59. Carter 11, 71 F.3d at 86; Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 313, 318. The artists were originally
engaged on a one-year contract, and it was extended for successive periods. After December 31,
1993, they no longer received health and insurance benefits. Carter II, 71 F.3d at 80; Carter 1, 861
F. Supp. at 312, 318-19.
60. Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 313.
61. Carter I, 71 F.3d at 80-81; Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 313.
62 Carter v. Helnsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
63. Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 337.
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First, the court concluded that the bulk of the artwork created by
the Three-Js in the Lobby of the building-"sculptural
elements . . . attached to the ceiling and the floor, interactive art, a
vast mosaic covering the majority of the floor of the Lobby and
portions of the walls and several sculptural elements, and the interior
of three elevators that open onto the Lobby"-was a "single work of
art," entitled to protection under VARA.6 This conclusion was
significant, as it meant that the artists only needed to prove that the
entire work-and not each particular component of it-was a "work of
recognized stature," the destruction or modification of which-if
"prejudicial to [the artists'] honor or reputation"-is prohibited by
VARA.65 In addition, if considered a "single work of art," then the
work certainly could not be removed from the building lobby without
causing it some distortion, mutilation, or other modification.
In concluding that the lobby artwork was a single work protected
by VARA, the court rejected Helmsley-Spear's contention that the art
was "work made for hire," a category imported from general copyright
law and expressly excluded from coverage under VARA6 The
standards defining a "work made for hire" under copyright law have
been most recently set out by the Supreme Court in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,6' and interpreted by the Second Circuit
in Aymes v. Bonelli.68 The district court applied the thirteen Reid
64. Id. at 314-15.
65. VARA § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). The District Court also concluded that the work
at issue was not "applied art," which is excluded from protection by VARA § 602, 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 ("work of visual art"). Defendants had argued that certain portions of the artwork were
applied art because they were affixed to otherwise utilitarian objects-namely, the ceilings and
floors of the building lobby. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 997
(2d Cir. 1980). The court rejected this contention, explaining:
nothing in VARA proscribes protection of works of visual art that incorporate
elements of, rather than constitute, applied art . . . . While plaintiffs arguably may
have incorporated sculptural elements that, if viewed alone, could be defined as applied
art, I find that the Work as a whole clearly is not applied art.
Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 315-16.
66. VARA § 602, 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("work of visual art"). Under copyright law, the copyright
of a work by an employee-that is, a "work made for hire"-vests in the employer or hiring
party, rather than in the creator of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). See generally Corey L.
Wishner, Note, Whose Work Is It Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid in Defining The Employer-Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made For Hire"
Doctrine, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 393 (1995); Alan Hyde & Christopher W. Hager, Promoting the
Copyright Act's Creator-Favoring Presumption: "Works Made for Hire" Under Aymes v. Bonelli
& Artec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 71 DFNv. U.L. REv. 693 (1994).
67. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
68. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
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factors,69 as explained by Aymes,7 giving special weight to five of
them. The court focused on the artists' right to control the creation of
the work, their skill as artists, and the fact that they were hired to
complete a specific task, as supporting the conclusion that they were
independent contractors and the work was therefore not "made for
hire." ' The court found that these factors outweighed the facts that
for three years, the artists received health and insurance benefits,
weekly checks, and W-2 forms from, and had their taxes withheld by,
the partnership-all factors indicating an employer-employee
relationship. 2 The court also concluded that the provision in the
artists' contract that they retained the copyright of the work supported
a finding "that plaintiffs were independent contractors rather than
employees. "I
The district court then considered whether "intentional distortion,
mutilation or other modification" of the work would be "prejudicial to
[the artists'] honor or reputation," a statutory prerequisite to relief
under VARA.74 On the basis of expert testimony, it found that the
artists met that standard.75 Next, the court considered whether the
69. In Reid, the Supreme Court explained that factors relevant to the "work made for hire"
inquiry include:
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished ...the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of
the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment;
the hiring party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
490 U.S. at 751-52 (footnotes and citations omitted). The Reid Court also noted that "[nlo one of
these factors is determinative." Id. at 752.
70. In Aymes, the Second Circuit explained that, "the Reid test was not intended to be
applied in a mechanistic fashion." 980 F.2d at 862. However, the court noted that "some
factors ...will be significant in virtually every situation." Id. at 861. Those factors include:
(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of creation; (2) the skill
required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired
party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party.
Id. at 861.
71. Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 322.
72. "The Limited Partnership ultimately discontinued this practice and plaintiffs neither
objected nor ceased construction of the Work." Id.
73. Id.
74. VARA § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (1994).
75. Carter , 861 F. Supp. at 324. The court quoted from VARA's legislative history, noting
that to be protected, "an author need not prove a pre-existing standing in the artistic community.
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work was of "recognized stature" and therefore protected by VARA
from destruction.76 The court interpreted this standard to require "(1)
that the visual art in question has 'stature,' i.e. is viewed as
meritorious, and (2) that this stature is 'recognized' by art experts,
other members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of
society."' Again looking to expert testimony presented by the parties,
the court found that the work satisfied this standard. 8 Interestingly,
this finding was based largely, although not entirely, on the notoriety
the work had achieved as a result of the lawsuit itself.79
The district court also rejected the defendants' contention that
VARA, as interpreted to protect the lobby art work, would violate the
Fifth Amendment by giving the right to control the owner's property
to a third party, thereby effecting a taking. The court relied on Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,' which upheld the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Law against a Fifth Amendment
challenge. In Penn Central, the Supreme Court held that several
factors supported the conclusion that the Landmarks Law did not
effect an impermissible taking: "The Landmarks Law (1) implemented
a comprehensive scheme designed to further the public interest; (2)
did not specifically or disproportionately burden plaintiff; (3) left
much of the commercial value of the property intact and did not
The Committee appreciates that less well-known or appreciated artists also have honor and
reputations worthy of protection." H.R. Rep. No. 514, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6925, quoted in Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 323.
76. Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 324-26 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B)).
77. Id. at 325.
7& Id. at 326. The court noted that an earlier version of VARA had included a provision
stating that a "court or other trier of fact may take into account the opinions of artists, art
dealers, collectors of fine art, and other persons involved with the creation, appreciation, history,
or marketing of works of recognized stature" in making this determination. Id. at 325 n.10; S.
1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S6811-13 (daily ed. June 16, 1989). Although this
language was omitted from the final version of VARA, the Carter Icourt stated that "courts can,
and should, consider these sources in determining whether a given work is of recognized stature."
Id. at 325 n.10.
79. Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 324-26. The court explained that:
VARA does not delineate when a work must attain "recognized stature" in order to be
entitled to protection . . . . [T]he Court does not view this as unintentional. The test
is whether the art work at issue is of recognized stature, not when it attained this status.
This interpretation is wholly consistent with the preservative goal of [17 U.S.C.
§ 106A]. It should be noted, however, that there is evidence in the record that the
Work became a work of recognized stature prior to the filing of plaintiffs' complaint in
this action.
Id. at 325 n.12 (emphasis in original).
80. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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interfere with plaintiffs primary economic use of the property; and (4)
included some reciprocity of benefits."'
The Carter court concluded that these factors all applied to
VARA and supported the conclusion that VARA's provision on art
work installed as part of real property also did not constitute a taking.
Notably, defendants had not shown any significant diminution in the
building's value as a result of the work in the lobby 2 Moreover, the
court noted that VARA has even less impact on property owners'
rights than the Landmarks Law at issue in Penn Central, because
VARA applies only to those protected works installed after its
effective date, and the protection lasts only for the lifetime of the
authors.' And, in contrast to the Landmarks Preservation Law, those
seeking to install works covered by VARA may contractually waive
protection.4
The court therefore granted an injunction prohibiting the building
owners from distorting, mutilating, modifying, or destroying the
work.' At the same time, the court refused the artists' request that
they be permitted to complete their project, noting that "VARA
mandates preservation of protected art work and the protection of
artists' moral rights. It does not mandate creation. "8
The district court's ruling left no one entirely happy and was
criticized by many. 87 The artists were unable to complete their work,
and the building owner was left with what it regarded as junk
cluttering up the lobby of the building. In its December 1995 decision,
the Second Circuit solved the owner's problem, if not the artists'.
Judge Cardamone's opinion reversed the trial court and held that the
art was a "work made for hire." The appeals court therefore
concluded that VARA did not apply at all to protect the artwork. 8
81. Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 327 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-35).
82. Id. at 328.
83. Id. at 327-28.
84. Id. at 328 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1)).
85. The court explained that, "[b]ecause elements of the Work must be destroyed in order
to be removed, the Work may not be removed from the Lobby." Carter I, 861 F. Supp. at 329.
86. Id. The court held that the defendants' refusal to allow the artists to complete their
work was not a "distortion, mutilation, or other modification" under VARA § 602, 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a)(3)(A).
87. See, e.g., Ann Landi, The Landlord, the Installation, the Artists, and Their Lawyers,
ARTNEWS, May 1995, at 125; Franklin Feldman, Court Rules Under Moral Rights Statute, 15
IFAR REPORTS, Dec. 1994, at 5.
8& Carter II, 71 F.3d at 88.
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The Second Circuit upheld the findings of the district court that
the "work" was essentially a single piece of art and that the work was
not "applied art."89 Yet when it came to reviewing the trial court's
finding that the artists were independent contractors and that the work
therefore was not "made for hire," the Second Circuit held that the
district court "correctly stated the legal test," but that "some of its
factual findings were ... clearly erroneous."' Based on its own
evaluation of the several "Reid factors," which the Second Circuit
noted are "easily misapplied,"'  the appellate court was persuaded
"that the factors that weigh in favor of finding the artists were
employees outweigh those factors supporting the artists' claim that
they were independent contractors." 92 Given that the artists received a
weekly salary and benefits for over two years, that the defendants paid
payroll and social security taxes, and that two of the artists filed for
unemployment benefits-listing the building's management company
as their former employer-after their positions were terminated,' the
court's conclusion was not particularly surprising.5 The court
explicitly recognized one troubling implication of its decision:
[B)y counting indicia such as health insurance and paid vacations
against the artists' independent contractor status, it may appear that
artists regrettably are being forced to choose between the personal
benefits inuring in an employment relationship and VARA's
protection of the artists' work afforded only to independent
contractors. 5
89. Carter 11, 71 F.3d at 84-85.
90. Id. at 85. The appeals court noted that, contrary to the conclusion of the district court,
the artists could be and were assigned additional projects by the management company, an
indication of employee status. Id. at 86.
91. Id. at 85.
92 Id. at 87.
93. Id. at 86-87.
94. One commentator has suggested that the Second Circuit's decision "evinces a
fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between the function of the 'work for hire'
provision" in the copyright and moral rights contexts; in the former, the standard is used to
determine who owns the copyright, while in the latter it determines whether the art is a "work of
visual art." Recent Case, Copyright-Visual Artists Rights Act-Second Circuit Holds Sculpture
to Be Unprotected "Work for Hire' 109 HARV. L. REV. 2110, 2113-14 (1996). While the same
"work made for hire" arguably serves different purposes in the two contexts, there is no
indication in the text of VARA or in its legislative history that Congress intended that the
copyright test of a "work made for hire" be applied differently in the context of moral rights. See
also WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL ARTWORKS: FINAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 163 (March 1, 1996)[hereinafter WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS].
95. Carter 11, 71 F.3d at 87. As if in compensation for this, the court also noted that
employers who denied artists the "basic attributes of employment" could not fall back on the
"work for hire" defense. Id.
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Having determined that the artwork was "made for hire" and that
VARA therefore did not apply, the Second Circuit did not address the
district court's determinations that the distortion or modification of
the artwork should be prohibited because it would be "prejudicial" to
the honor or reputation of the artists, and that the artwork was of
"recognized stature" and consequently protected from destruction by
VARA. 96 Nor did the appeals court confront VARA's provision
concerning art incorporated into buildings, the defendants' Fifth
Amendment takings argument, or the plaintiffs' contention that
VARA entitled them to complete the "unfinished" portion of the
work, all three issues reached by the trial court. The result is that the
trial court's opinion remains as the only decision to date interpreting
significant aspects of VARA.
The trial court's ruling in Carter highlighted VARA's unusual
provision requiring that a work incorporated into a building which
cannot be removed without damage remain affixed to a building unless
the owner and artist have agreed that it may be removed.97 As noted,
this is the reciprocal of the provision in California (and some other
state laws) that presumes such a work may be removed unless the
owner agrees that it will remain. The House Report on VARA
describes the provision on removal as "[d]rawn from similar provisions
in the California statute," but then states the rule, as embodied in the
statute, that is in fact the opposite of California's.' It is difficult to
believe Congress really intended this result.' California's rule makes
more sense: The owner of real property ought to be able to remove
permanently-installed art work unless he has agreed not to do so.
Such a change in the statute would also vitiate the takings issues
raised by this provision of VARA, issues which the current Supreme
Court may well take more seriously than the district court in Carter
96. Id. at 88. The district court treated the threat to the artwork as both modification and
destruction; therefore, the court determined both "prejudice" and "recognized stature." Carter 1,
861 F. Supp. at 329.
97. VARA § 604, 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1) (1994).
98. H.R. Rep. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6929-30.
99. So unlikely was the provision that Congress did enact, that at least one of the leading
moral rights scholars has apparently simply assumed that VARA and the California statute adopt
the same rule on this issue. See Edward J. Damich, A Comparison of State and Federal Moral
Rights Protection: Are Artists Better Off After VARA?, 15 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 953, 963
(1993). Others anticipated situations like that in the Carter case and warned that "difficult
problems may arise." E.g., Thomas Goetzl, Peril of Art, RECORDER, Oct. 8,1991, at 8.
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did.1 D As in Carter, an owner who leases its property may find its
building physically occupied by artwork it was not aware of, may
dislike or find offensive, and cannot remove.1°1 This physical invasion
may not be "permanent," as the district court in Carter emphasized,
but it would continue until the death (or consent) of the artist, which
may seem permanent as far as the owner is concerned.
Finally, the district court's decision also assumed that a work even
an artist herself regards as incomplete is subject to VARA's
protections. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to protect
such work, and there is no indication that it did. On the other hand,
some widely recognized works of art are known to be unfinished, yet
valued all the same. At the least, one would expect that the unfinished
nature of the work, coupled with the artists' insistence that completion
was necessary, would have entered into the district court's analysis of
whether the work was of "recognized stature" or whether its distortion
or modification would be "prejudicial to the honor or reputation" of
the artists. The district court, however, did not mention this issue. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Carter on May 20, 1996.12
B. Preemption by VARA
As noted, a significant issue raised by the enactment of VARA is
the degree to which the statute preempts the existing state laws that
also protect artists' moral rights. While many commentators have
discussed the application of VARA's preemption provision,"' the
cases decided since 1991 shed only a little light on the area.
100. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
101. One lesson of Carter is that owners who lease their property should include in the lease
an explicit provision prohibiting any installation of work that would implicate VARA.
(Helmsley-Spear appears to have learned its lesson. See WAIVER OF MORAL RIGrrs, supra note 94,
at 178 (quoting new waiver language of Helmsley Spear's standard lease)). Such a provision may
provide some recourse against the lessee in the event the lessee allows for the installation of
protected artwork. Of course, as appears to have happened in Carter, such recourse may only be
against an insolvent lessee. See Carter 11, 71 F.3d at 81; Carter , 861 F. Supp. at 313.
102. 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996).
103. See, e.g., Joshua H. Brown, Creators Caught in the Middle: Visual Artists Rights Act
Preemption of State Moral Rights Laws, 15 HASTINGS CoMM/ENr L.J. 1003 (1993); Amy L.
Landers, The Current State of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Artists in the United States, 15
HASTINGS CoMm/ENT L.J. 165, 183-98 (1992); Zuber, supra note 38, at 492-508; Brett Sirota, Note,
The Visual Artists Rights Act: Federal Versus State Moral Rights, 21 HOFSmA L. REV. 461, 475-80
(1992); Karlen, supra note 40, at 927-28; Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights and Real Life Artists, 15
HASTINGS CoMm/Er L.J. 929, 946-47 (1993); Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 489-90.
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In Lubner v. City of Los Angeles,' the California Court of
Appeal provided an interesting discussion of California's moral rights
statute and, incidentally, of its preemption by VARA. The California
statute, Civil Code section 987, opens by declaring:
[T]hat the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an
expression of the artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's
reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their
works of fine art against such alteration or destruction; and that
there is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural
and artistic creations.' °
The key operative provision of section 987 provides that "[n]o person,
except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art which the
artist has created, shall intentionally commit, or authorize the
intentional commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art."' The remedial
provision of the statute states that "[t]o effectuate the rights created
by this section, the artist may commence an action to recover or
obtain" injunctive relief, actual damages, punitive damages, and
reasonable attorneys' fees.1°7
Plaintiffs Martin and Lorraine Lubner, both recognized painters,
lived and worked at their home in Los Angeles. Early one morning in
November 1991, a parked city garbage truck rolled down a hill and
crashed into the Lubners' home, damaging their house, their cars, and
a considerable portion of their artwork, including paintings, drawings,
prints, and posters."~ At trial, the Lubners offered substantial
evidence of their experience and stature as painters, such as the
institutions where they had taught and the various museums that had
purchased their paintings. The trial court declined to admit this
evidence, and the Lubners appealed from a damages award they
viewed as insufficient. 109
104. 45 Cal. App. 4th 525 (1996).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West 1996).
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1).
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e).
108. The Lubners first sought compensation from State Farm, their homeowners insurance
carrier. After arbitration over the value of the destroyed art, the Lubners recovered $265,820 as
property damages for the artwork, along with some additional sums. Not satisfied, the Lubners
then sued the City of Los Angeles for negligence, seeking property damages that exceeded their
insurance policy limits and damages for loss of reputation and emotional distress. See Lubner, 45
Cal. App. 4th at 527-28.
109. After a trial on the fair market value of the lost artwork, the Lubners were awarded a
total of $51,774.44 over what they had already recovered from State Farm. Id. at 528.
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The primary question before the Lubner court was whether
California's moral rights statute applies to destruction that is merely
negligent.n0 The court noted that section 987(c)(1) provides only that
anyone other than the artist shall not "intentionally commit, or
authorize the intentional commission of, any physical defacement,
mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art," while
section 987(c)(2) prohibits one who frames, conserves, or restores fine
art from defacing, mutilating, altering, or destroying it through "any
act constituting gross negligence," allowing the court to conclude that
neither provision supported a cause of action for destruction of fine
art based on simple negligence."1 Nor was the court persuaded by the
Lubners' reliance on the broad prefatory language of section 987,
because the court concluded that the standard for the remedies
available was to be found in the remedial provisions of section 987(c)
and therefore that no remedy for loss of reputation due to negligence
was intended," a conclusion plainly supported by the language of the
statute.
The Lubner court's conclusion is also entirely consistent with the
underlying concept of moral rights. As recognized in France and as
imported to this country, moral rights have been recognized as non-
economic rights personal to the artist and, sometimes, to the artist's
heirs as well. Such rights can be protected but, by their nature, their
loss cannot be compensated for in the way that the loss of economic
rights can. The Lubner case presented a situation where the tortfeasor
did not have any idea that the property being destroyed was, in part,
fine art. The public interest-"in preserving the integrity of cultural
and artistic creations," according to the California statute" 3 -is not
served by making negligent tortfeasors liable for unknowingly altering
or destroying works of fine art. In such circumstances, no particular
policy is served by providing remedies beyond the economic value of
the artwork.
110. The Lubners apparently did not seek redress under VARA, perhaps because, as noted
below, the federal statute was, more clearly than California's law, inapplicable. In addition, much
of the artwork at issue was likely created before VARA's effective date.
111. Id. at 529.
112. Id. at 529-30. The court also declined to "exercise [its] judicial power to create a
common law right, separate from section 987, to recover damages for loss of reputation." Id. at
530.
113. CAL. CIV. CODE §987(a). The House Report on VARA includes comparable language
on the purposes of the federal statute, to "protect both the reputations of certain visual artists
and the works of art they create." H.R. Rep. No. 514, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6915.
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In concluding the California statute did not support the Lubners'
claim for damages for loss of reputation, the court, in dicta, stated that
even if section 987 could be read to create a right to recover
reputational damages based on negligence, the California statute
would be preempted by VARA. The court focused on the fact that
VARA explicitly states that only "intentional or grossly negligent
destruction" of artwork gives rise to a cause of action.114 And because
the preemption provision of VARA provides that "no person is
entitled to any ... equivalent right in any work of visual art under
the common law or statutes of any State,"'1 the Lubner court
reasoned that any rights the Lubners might have under California law
would be preempted.
While the court was no doubt correct that VARA's plain
language only applies to intentional or grossly negligent destruction of
artwork, its conclusion that this necessarily preempts any broader right
under California law is troubling. If California law did provide
remedies for loss of an artist's reputation due to mere negligence,
while VARA did not, then the California right might not be
"equivalent" to the rights conferred by federal law and therefore
might not be preempted. This is significant not so much in the context
presented in Lubner-as noted, the court had already concluded that
California law also did not provide a cause of action based on
negligent destruction-but because the federal and California moral
rights laws actually differ in a number of notable ways. VARA's
definition of a "work of visual art" differs from California's definition
of "fine art" which means that, among other differences, federal moral
114. VARA § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1994). Interestingly, the legislative history behind
this provision of VARA explains that the bill:
as introduced did not require a particular state of mind, nor did it expressly require a
nexus between a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of a work
and any subsequent harm to the author's reputation or honor. The Committee
endorses the amendment in the nature of a substitute, which clarifies that the right of
integrity extends only to the intentional and negligent acts or omissions, and that those
acts or omissions must have been committed with respect to the work at issue. Thus, for
example, while an author may assert the integrity right where his or her work is
destroyed in a fire caused for purpose of collecting insurance on the work, the author
may not assert the right where the fire is caused by someone accidentally forgetting to
turn off a coffee pot.
H.R. Rep. No. 514, at 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6926 (emphasis added). This
view of the extent of the right of integrity supports the conclusion reached by the Lubner court.
115. VARA § 605, 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1) (1994).
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rights protection may not apply to works in glass." 6 Under California
law, an artist has a right to prevent the mutilation or alteration of a
work of "recognized quality,"" 7 while federal law extends such
protection only if the "distortion, mutilation, or other
modification . . .would be prejudicial to [the artist's] honor or
reputation" and, with respect to destruction, only if the work is of
"recognized stature.""
Federal copyright cases have generally held state laws preempted
if the right is within the scope of federal copyright law and is
"equivalent in substance" to that provided by federal law."9 The
cursory analysis of the Lubner court appears to assume that the rights
conferred by California law are "equivalent" to that granted by
VARA. However, the statutory differences certainly suggest that
there could be situations where an artist's rights under California law
would not be equivalent to, and perhaps should not be considered
preempted by, federal law.'i
The preemption issue is already emerging as troublesome with
respect to other state statutes that differ more significantly from
VARA than does the California statute. For example, New York's
version of the artist's right of integrity prohibits any person other than
the artist from
knowingly display[ing] in a place accessible to the public or
publish[ing] a work of fine art . . .in an altered, defaced, mutilated
or modified form if the work is displayed, published or reproduced
as being the work of the artist, or under circumstances under which
it would reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artist, and
damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result
therefrom .... 121
116. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §987(b)(2) (West 1996), with 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)("works
of art"). It is said that the inclusion of works of glass in the California statute by a 1982
amendment was due to the fact that the spouse of a staff member of one California legislator
worked in that medium. See Thomas M. Goetzl, California Art Legislation Goes Federal:
Progress in the Protection of Artists' Rights, 15 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 893, 899 (1993). See
H.R. Report No. 514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6931 (suggesting no
preemption in this context).
117. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2), (c)(1).
118. 17 U.S.C. 106A(a)(3); see H.R. Report No. 514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6931 (suggesting preemption despite differences).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); see, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36
F.3d 1147,1164-65 (lst Cir. 1994); see generally 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 1.01[B] (1996).
120. See H.R. Report No. 514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6931; see also
supra, text accompanying notes 103-118.
121. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1) (Consol. 1996).
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In Pavia v. 1120 Ave. of the Americas Associates,'2 the artist
complained the sculpture he had made for display in the lobby of a
Hilton Hotel in New York City had been partially disassembled and
moved, and was currently displayed in its altered state at another
location. While disassembly occurred prior to VARA's effective date,
the display had continued past that date.' The artist asserted a
violation of VARA (by the disassembly) and of New York law (by the
display).
The district court found the New York statute applied to the
continuing display of the altered work within New York's three-year
statute of limitations period.' 2 However, it held VARA was
inapplicable: "[U]nlike the New York statute, which explicitly
proscribes improper display, rights under VARA arise from the actual
acts of 'distortion, mutilation, or other modification. "'I Since the acts
of modification occurred before VARA's effective date, they gave rise
to no rights under VARA; and, since VARA did not apply, there
could be no question of its preempting the New York statute.1 The
court's logic, while sound, raises an interesting preemption issue when
VARA does apply: as VARA relates only to the act of "distortion,
mutilation, or other modification," 1' while New York law prohibits
the continuing display of a work or reproduction in an "altered,
defaced, mutilated or modified form,"'  the two laws arguably do not
confer "rights that are equivalent" at all. I Accordingly, the basic right
of integrity conferred by New York law may survive VARA's
enactment, and there is a colorable basis for an aggrieved artist to seek
redress under both statutes, as the plaintiff in Pavia attempted to do.'
122. 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
123. Although the work was created before the effective date of VARA and would therefore
normally not be covered by VARA § 610(b)(2), there is an exception for works such as that in
Pavia, created before the effective date but "title [to which] has not, as of such effective date,
been transferred from" the artist. See Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 628 (quoting VARA § 610(b)(1)).
124. Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 625-26.
125. Id. at 628 (quoting VARA § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)).
126. Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 626-29.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
12& N.Y. ART. & CULT. Ai'. LAW § 14.03(1).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1). The Pavia court noted that "[w]hether the rights conferred by
VARA are equivalent to those of [N.Y. ART. & CULT. AFF.] § 14.03 'will occupy courts for years
to come."' 901 F. Supp. at 626 (quoting Charles Ossola, Law for Artt Sake, RECORDER, Jan. 8,
1991, at 6).
130. The New York statute presents other difficult preemption issues that are yet to be
litigated. Consistent with its emphasis on protecting the reputation of an artist, New York law
covers reproductions as well as original works of art; it also applies to limited edition multiples of
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Another intriguing issue analogous to preemption was raised but
not decided in Moakley v. Eastwick,ul which concerned the 1985
Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, modelled in large part on the
California statute. In 1972, artist John Moakley had created a wall
mural of ceramic tiles on the property of a Unitarian church. The
property was subsequently acquired by a Baptist church that proposed
in 1989 to demolish the wall because it found the artwork
objectionable on religious grounds-a reprise of the Crimi case from
1949. m Moakley sought to enjoin the demolition. The trial court
found the Massachusetts law (which proscribes "the intentional
commission of any physical defacement . . . of a work of fine art")M
would apply, but held an injunction would violate the free expression
of religion guaranteed to the church by the United States and
Massachusetts constitutionsY
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did not
reach the interesting constitutional question of whether and when the
art owner's rights of freedom of religious expression and freedom of
speech might trump the moral rights of the artist, an issue presented
by both VARA and the analogous state statutes.m Instead, the court
concluded that the state moral rights statute was inapplicable because
it did not explicitly apply to art works created before its effective date,
and the court found no legislative intent that the law was to be applied
other than prospectively. 36 Moakley lost, and the court did not discuss
not more than three hundred copies. N.Y. ART. & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1). VARA, in contrast,
only applies to original works and limited editions of two hundred copies or fewer that are
"signed and consecutively numbered by the author." VARA § 601, 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("work of
visual art"). It remains to be seen whether VARA preempts New York's protection of
reproductions and limited editions that are larger than two hundred copies or not numbered by
the author. See Sirota, supra note 103, at 478.
131. Moakley v. Eastwick, 666 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1996).
132. See supra, text accompanying notes 10-14.
133. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §85S(c) (West 1985). VARA was not at issue in
Moakley, probably because the federal law does not apply to visual art created before June 1,
1991 unless title has not yet been transferred from the artist. VARA § 610(b)(1).
134. Moakley, 666 N.E.2d at 506. The trial court decision is discussed in Greg Reibman,
Against a Stone Wall, ARTNEWs, Sept 1992, at 27.
135. Most constitutional challenges to moral rights statutes have been based on the takings
clause of the fifth amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 54-102. See also Karlen, supra
note 103, at 947-48.
136. The Moakley court contrasted the Massachusetts statute with California's Civil Code
section 9870), which expressly provides that it shall "apply to claims based on proscribed acts
occurring on or after [the effective date of the act] to works of fine art whenever created."
Massachusetts' section 85S contains no comparable language. See 666 N.E.2d at 505, 510.
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whether the church's freedom of expression rights might displace the
artist's statutory moral rights.
C. Waiver of Moral Rights
As noted above, at the time of VARA's adoption there was
concern in Congress that the rights being created by the statute would
be routinely waived by artists. Congress therefore required that any
waiver be specific and in writing.' It also directed the Register of
Copyrights to conduct a study of the extent to which artists' rights
have been waived and to report to Congress not later than five years
after VARA's enactment, along with any recommendations resulting
from the study.' That study was submitted to Congress in March
1996.1 It contains a number of interesting observations, but few firm
conclusions. As part of the study, the Register of Copyrights solicited
comments, held a public hearing, and conducted a survey designed to
ascertain how artists are affected by VARA's waiver provision:
whether waivers routinely occur as a result of inequalities in
bargaining powers and whether the waivers are in writing as VARA
requires.1 ° The Register received survey responses from nearly a
thousand individuals who described themselves as "visual artists"-
that is, authors of a "work of visual art."'141
Some of the conclusions supported by these responses are clearer
than others. The study suggests that artists' awareness of moral rights
137. VARA provides that waivers must be in writing, signed by the author, and "specifically
identify the work, and uses of that work, to which the waiver applies." VARA § 603, 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(e)(1) (1994).
138. VARA § 608(a); see H.R. Rep. No. 514, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6932.
139. WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 94. The original December 1, 1995, deadline for
the REPORT was extended by the appropriate Congressional committees. See id. app. at 116-17.
140. WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 94.
141. Id. at 131 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). The Report is not entirely clear about the
methodology used to distribute the surveys, or to evaluate the sample of visual artists who
actually returned the surveys. The survey was distributed to "hundreds of arts-related
organizations," most of which "agreed to disburse multiple copies of the survey to their
members." WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS at 125, 126 ("The Office mailed 6,800 surveys; many of
these were reported to be duplicated in the hundreds by their recipients.") It is therefore not
clear how many individuals in fact received the survey, or whether the 1,061 individuals who
returned the survey represented a fair cross-section of visual artists generally or of the group that
received the survey specifically, or whether the group that returned the survey might be skewed
in some significant direction (for example, toward individuals with a greater pre-existing
knowledge of moral rights or with a higher or lower annual income from art). See generally
EUGENE J. WEBB, ET AL., NONREACTIVE MEASURES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 61-65 (2d ed.
1981)(discussing varieties of sampling errors).
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in general, and of rights under VARA in particular, is hardly
universal. Seventy-three percent of the respondents were aware that
artists who create certain works of visual arts had moral rights with
respect to those works. Forty-one percent stated that they were aware
that these rights could be waived, and thirty two percent responded
that they knew such a waiver had to be specific and in writingyU Not
surprisingly, awareness of VARA's waiver provision was greater
among artists whose annual gross income from art was more than
$25,000, but these individuals constituted less than ten percent of those
responding. 13 The Register's Report concludes that "many artists
(particularly those earning less than $10,000 annually from the sale of
art) and art consumers are unaware of federal statutory moral rights,
and are particularly unaware of VARA's waiver provisions."'144
The apparent frequency of waiver clauses was also fairly small.
Only seventeen percent of those surveyed had seen contracts with a
clause waiving moral rights. Of this subset, only thirteen percent
(approximately two percent of the total) reported that such clauses are
routinely included in contracts for the sale of works of art.' Eight
percent of the artists had themselves waived moral rights, and twenty-
three percent knew of other artists who had been asked to do so.146
Notably, thirteen percent of the artists said they had turned down an
offer of sale because the contract included a moral rights waiver, and
fourteen percent had insisted that a waiver clause be omitted from an
agreement before signing.'47 Six percent responded that they had been
pressured or coerced into waiving their moral rights. ' Based on these
results, the study concludes that no clear opinion was found "as to
whether the existence or abolition of waiver might have a chilling
142. WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 132. One survey of twenty-two "well-
established Massachusetts artists" found that as of 1995 only half of them were aware of VARA.
Id. app. at 73-74 (testimony of Deborah Benson).
143. WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 132-33.
144. Id. at 185.
145. Id. at 134. However, of all respondents, seven percent expressed the opinion that waiver
clauses are routinely included in artists' written contracts. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 135-36. An artist "was more likely to have turned down an offer including a moral
rights waiver and to insist such a waiver be struck if he or she was represented by an agent or an
artist's representative, the .art produced more than $25,000 annually or provided the artist's sole
income, or the artist had previously waived moral rights in a signed contract." Id.
148. Id. at 137.
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effect on artists' employment."149 Significantly, sixty-one percent of
respondents said they thought oral contracts are most common in the
art world.m This is apparently particularly common with respect to
"moveables"-that is, art not affixed to buildings. 151 Because of this
practice, the Report concludes that, "[t]he operation of the waiver
provision is so far somewhat ephemeral .... The vast majority of
artists do not have a written contract for commission of their visual art
works." M
There was considerable disagreement in the testimony presented
to the Register concerning whether VARA's general waiver provision
should be amended or eliminated. In light of the prevalence of oral
contracts, which "cannot include a valid waiver," and the absence of
any "contractual evidence or case law guidance . .. to indicate
whether modification of the waiver provisions, for example to
eliminate waiver for all but non-moveable art ...would strengthen
artists' bargaining power or negatively affect their employment or
earnings," the Report concludes that "perhaps no legislative change
on waivability for moveables is warranted at this time." 1
149. Id. at 185. This contrasts with the views of some commentators, who have advocated
eliminating or sharply curtailing the ability of artists to waive their moral rights under VARA.
See, e.g., Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned
Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 413 & n.241, 427-29 (1985); Dana L. Burton, Artists' Moral
Rights: Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 639, 666 (1995).
Artists and their advocates usually assert that artists' limited bargaining power will lead to
widespread waivers if waiver is allowed at all. See, e.g., WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 94,
app. at 21 (statement of John Carter); id. app. at 54 (statement of Theodore H. Feder); see also
Sherman, supra at 414-15; Burton, supra at 665. As indicated in the text, the Report did not find
significant evidence of this practice. WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 185. Moreover,
sophisticated, well-established artists will refuse commissions when unacceptable waiver
conditions are requested. According to the Report, over a quarter of artists whose art provides
gross income exceeding $25,000 annually have turned down offers of sale where the contract
included a waiver. Id. at 136.
In one well-publicized instance, the sculptor Richard Serra declined to provide a proposed
48-foot tall tower of rusted steel for the parking lot in front of the newly renovated Palace of the
Legion of Honor in San Francisco, rather than allow the City the right to remove or resite the
work. See Patricia Failing, An Unsitely Mess, ARTNEWS, Oct. 1994, at 150; Carol Vogel, Inside
Art, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at C26. Serra had earlier unsuccessfully fought to keep another of
his site-specific works from been removed at a time when no applicable law prevented such
action. See Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
150. WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 94, at 135.
151. Id. app. at 6 (testimony of Gilbert Edelson)("Written agreements for art transactions
are rare.").
152 Id. at 184.
153. Id. at 190-91.
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One of the few straightforward assertions in the Report is that the
artist's ability to waive moral rights with respect to works permanently
affixed to a building should be retained.-' The Report notes that "[a]
consensus developed . . . that waivability is necessary for works
incorporated into buildings," but does not consider whether the actual
waiver provision in VARA for such works was appropriate. The
report simply states that "any problems incurred as a result of a tenant
contracting for installation of art works in a building could be avoided
by contractual agreements between the landlord and tenant.' M This
conclusion seems unrealistic. Although consistent with VARA's
general approach to waiver-to make it difficult for moral rights not to
apply-the provision concerning waiver of rights with respect to works
permanently affixed to buildings places a considerable and
unpredictable burden on owners of real property, as is well
demonstrated by Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.
Conclusion
The Report's conclusion that artists' agreements to sell their
works are usually oral is probably its most significant finding. The
prevalence of oral agreements underscores the importance of VARA's
provisions being clear and easily understood. As VARA's protections
cannot be waived orally, they will apply to most relationships between
artists and galleries, collectors, or building owners-whether or not
the parties consider the statute at the time of contracting.
As even the few reported cases concerning VARA suggest,
uncertainties abound, both with respect to the federal law itself and
with respect to its displacement of analogous state statutes.
Unfortunately, only further litigation is likely to clarify some of the
apparent traps and ambiguities presented by VARA, and to bring to
light other, as yet unnoticed, complications and problems presented by
the statute.
154. Id. at 189 (referring to 17 U.S.C. 113(d)(1)(B) (1994)).
155. Id. at 189.
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